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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CHRISTOPHER S. KASSUHN : Case No. 20030771-CA 
and 
LISA MARIE MANZANARES, : Case No. 20030813-CA 
Defendants/Appellants. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Contrary to the State's argument, this Court should reverse the denial of the 
motion to suppress because Defendants were seized without reasonable suspicion, the 
search of their persons and their car exceeded the scope of the initial stop, Officer Burton 
was not legally present when he saw a bundle of mail in plain view, and Defendant 
Hadden did not voluntarily consent to a search of her car and the evidence seized by 
Officer Burton was tainted by the prior illegality of the illegal detention. 
ARGUMENT 
OFFICER BURTON CONDUCTED A LEVEL-TWO DETENTION 
OF THE DEFENDANTS, WHICH WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
REASONABLE SUSPICION AND THEREFORE VIOLATED THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT. 
Contrary to the State's argument, this Court should reverse because (1) Officer 
Burton did not have reasonable suspicion to support the stop of Defendants under the 
totality of the circumstances test, (2) the search of Defendants exceeded the scope of the 
stop, (3) Officer Burton was not legally present when he saw the bundle of mail in plain 
view, nor was the evidence in plain view clearly incriminating, and (4) Defendant 
Hadden did not voluntarily consent to the search of the car and the evidence seized was 
tainted by the prior illegality of the unlawful detention. 
1. Officer Burton did not have reasonable suspicion to detain Defendants 
at the inception of the stop, even in light of the totality of the 
circumstances. 
The State's argument that Officer Burton had reasonable suspicion, under the 
totality of the circumstances, to detain Defendants must fail because Officer Burton did 
not have specific and articulable facts to support that assertion. In considering the 
totality of the circumstances, this Court has noted that a finding of reasonable suspicion 
may be based upon "' unusual conduct' that would lead a reasonable person to believe 
that criminal activity may be afoot." State v. Rodriguez-Lopi, 954 P.2d 1290, 1293 
(Utah Ct. App. 1998). A finding of "unusual conduct" calls for a subjective analysis, 
however, and the standard still requires "specific and articulable facts" to support 
reasonable suspicion. Salt Lake City v. Rav, 2000 UT App 55, ^|18, 998 P.2d 274 
(citations omitted); see also State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36 Tjl, 78 P.3d 590 ("The officer's 
subjective belief may . . . be factored into the objective analysis, though it is never alone 
determinative." In fact, the Utah Court of Appeals has reversed convictions where it has 
found that "there were no specific, articulable objective facts that would lead a 
2 
reasonable person to suspect that criminal conduct was occurring or about to occur." 
State v. Struhs. 940 P.2d 1225, 1229 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
The facts in Struhs are similar to this case. In Strahs, the officer was patrolling 
North Salt Lake when she observed the defendant's truck heading toward a construction 
site that indicated Mroad closed." 940 P.2d at 1226. The officer claimed that she was 
suspicious because the truck was in a closed area at night, when no one was working, 
and because numerous theft complaints had been made in the same area in the past. Id. 
The officer then blocked the defendant's car with her own vehicle, approached the truck 
with her partner, and saw three people inside. Id. The people were situated in such a 
way inside the truck that they had to "look[] up toward the patrol vehicle." Id_ Upon 
reaching the truck, the officer was able to see various drug paraphernalia, for which the 
defendant was arrested. Id, The defendant moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that 
the officer did not have sufficient articulable suspicion. IJL The court agreed, holding 
that "[i]n the face of any number of possible innocent explanations for defendant's 
behavior, there were no specific articulable objective facts that would lead a reasonable 
person to suspect that criminal conduct was occurring or about to occur." IdL at 1229. 
Specifically, the court recognized that several possible "innocent explanations" for the 
defendant's behavior included the possibility that a couple might park in an isolated area 
to "make out," that a worker might return to the site to pick up a forgotten lunch pail, or 
an otherwise law-abiding person might go to a spot which is not their home to merely 
3 
think or to smoke a cigarette. Id. at 1229, n. 4. 
The same analysis is true in this case. Officer Burton was only notified of the 
parked car by an anonymous caller. K.R. 48:1. There had been no complaints of theft or 
any other calls about criminal activity in the neighborhood where the defendants were 
located. Officer Burton did not witness Defendants engaged in any criminal activity. 
Furthermore, Defendants were lying down in the car, which is consistent with "any 
number of possible innocent explanations'1 such as lying down to "make out," relaxing 
while waiting for a friend (which would be consistent with Defendants Kassuhn and 
Manzanares' statements to Officer Burton), smoking a cigarette, or merely just thinking. 
Id at 1129, n. 4; K.R. 48:5. 
In support of its argument that the stop was reasonable under the "totality of the 
circumstances," the State cites to several cases. Br. Aple. at 10-14. Each of the cases 
cited by the State, however, can be distinguished from the facts in the instant case, 
because each case was initiated with a traffic violation or suspicion of an actual, concrete 
crime. The State first cites to State v. Rodriguez-Lopi. wherein the defendant committed 
two possible traffic or criminal violations in plain sight of the officers. Br. Aple. at 10, 
954 P.2d at 1291. First, the officers witnessed the defendant pull out of the normal 
traffic lane, proceed to the curb where cars usually park, and continue driving at a rate of 
10 miles per hour in the parking lane. Id. Second, the officers realized that the reason 
the defendant had performed the "unusual driving maneuver" was to converse with two 
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known prostitutes on the side of the road. Id. It was only after observing these activities, 
which were part of a cumulative indication of criminal activity, that the officers turned 
on their lights to stop the defendant's vehicle. IJL And it was only after initiating the 
stop that the officers saw the defendant trying to hide something under his seat. Id. The 
Court of Appeals held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to effectuate the stop 
because Mthe police officers saw defendant driving outside the normal traffic lane in an 
area routinely used for parking" and "while driving, defendant leaned over to the 
passenger window and spoke with two known prostitutes.'1 Id_at 1292-93. Thus, the 
court held that the officers in Rodriguez-Lopi had reasonable suspicion only after 
observing two possible violations of the law by the defendant, one traffic and one 
possibly criminal. 
The facts in Rodriguez-Lopi can be distinguished from the instant case in several 
ways. First, the officers who conducted the stop witnessed first-hand indication of 
possible illegal behavior by the defendant when he pulled out of the normal traffic lane 
in violation of the traffic laws to converse with two known prostitutes. IdL at 1291. At 
that moment, the officers might have had reasonable suspicion to believe that the 
defendant was soliciting a prostitute, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1303 
(1973), and thus reasonable suspicion would arguably have been present to justify a stop. 
In the present case, however, Officer Burton did not witness Defendants engaged in any 
illegal activity, nor did he observe any behavior that might have indicated such. 
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Although lying down in a car may not be regular behavior, it is certainly not illegal 
behavior. See Utah Code Ann. (2003). Second, the State, in its comparison of 
Rodriguez-Lopi to the present case, states only that f,[l]ike Rodriguez-LopL in this case 
there was reasonable suspicion to stop because Officer Burton observed "unusual 
conduct," three people hiding in a car attempting to avoid detection." Br. Aple. at 10. 
However, the State's reliance on Officer Burton's subjective determination that 
Defendants were hiding in their car, rather than lying down, is insufficient to support a 
finding of reasonable suspicion. See Warren, 2003 UT 36, TJ20 (finding that "an officer's 
subjective belief alone is insufficient to validate or invalidate" a level-two detention). 
The next case relied upon by the State is Illinois v. Wardlow. Br. Aple. at 11; 528 
U.S. 119 (2000). In Wardlow, a four car caravan holding Chicago Police Department 
officers traveled into an area that was well known for its illegal drug trafficking, for the 
purpose of investigating illicit narcotic activity. Id. at 121. As the caravan entered the 
area, two of the officers noticed the defendant look in their direction and then flee on 
foot. IdL at 121-22. The officers pursued the defendant, and when they caught him, they 
conducted a protective Terry frisk, because in the officer's experience, "it was common 
for there to be weapons in the near vicinity of the narcotics transactions." Ij±_ at 122. As 
a result of the pat-down, the officers discovered a loaded .38 caliber handgun in the 
defendant's bag. IdL. The Supreme Court held that the fact that the defendant was in a 
high crime area known for heavy drug trafficking at the time of his apprehension, as well 
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as his "unprovoked flight upon noticing the police," were both factors to be considered 
when determining reasonable suspicion, but were not "necessarily indicative of 
wrongdoing." IjL at 124-125. 
Wardlow, too, can be distinguished from the facts of the present case. First, when 
the officers first spotted the defendant, they were in an area that was known for its illicit 
drug trade, and moreover, the officers were in that area for the very purpose of 
investigating such criminal behavior. IdL, at 121. Second, it was clear that the defendant 
in Wardlow ran from the police, engaging in "headlong flight" Id. at 122, 124-125. The 
court allowed the subsequent search and seizure of the defendant to determine why the 
defendant had fled. Id_ at 125. In the present case, however, Defendants were not in an 
area known for drug activity or other criminal behavior. Furthermore, Defendants did 
not obviously flee from or evade the police. There was no "headlong flight." Instead, 
the Defendants were lying down in their car. K.R. 48:11. Officer Burton, in his 
testimony at the motion to suppress hearing, admitted that he made an assumption that 
Defendants were hiding, when, in fact, they might have been simply lying down in their 
car, which is a completely legal activity. K.R. 48:11. Thus, unlike the defendant in 
Wardlow. Officer Burton had no indication that Defendants were present in a high crime 
area, that Defendants had committed any crime or that they were about to commit any 
crime, nor did Defendants engage in headlong flight. Thus, reliance on the facts in 
Wardlow is misplaced. 
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This is not a case of ambiguity, as claimed by the State. Br. Aple. at 11, 17. 
Unlike the defendant in Wardlow, there had not been any reports of criminal activity in 
the neighborhood where Defendants were detained. Officer Burton had no reason to 
believe Defendants were hiding or to suspect that they were engaged in criminal 
behavior. Upon questioning, he could not articulate any objective reason why he thought 
Defendants were engaged in criminal activity and were hiding instead of merely lying 
down in the car, stating only that "I would assume that normal people wouldn't lay down 
on the floorboard of a car late at night." K.R. 48:11; see. also Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225, 
1229. Therefore, there was no ambiguity to resolve. 
Even when an officer does not know why a defendant is lying down in a car, he 
does not have unbridled discretion to stop the person and search him. In Commonwealth 
v. Kennedy, the court found that an officer did not have the "necessary specific and 
articulable facts" to justify the detention of the defendant who was found lying in his car 
in a vacant parking lot. 15 Pa. D. & C. 4th 336, 341 (Pa. C. 1992). The officer in 
Kennedy was called to investigate complaints of loud noises, which sounded like 
gunshots. IcL at 337. When the officer did not find the source of the noise, he proceeded 
to drive through the area anyway, and his suspicion was raised when he noticed two cars 
in a dark parking lot, and in one, a man who looked like he was "lying down or possibly 
hiding." LI When the officer approached the car to ask for the man's identification, he 
noticed the smell of burnt marijuana and two smoked joints in the ashtray. IcL at 338. 
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Subsequent searches of the defendant's person and car revealed additional narcotics, and 
the defendant was placed under arrest. Id. The court, in dismissing the charge against 
the defendant, stated that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion because he "had 
not formulated a belief that the defendant was engaged in criminal conduct... Rather, he 
simply wished to see what the defendant was doing.'1 Id. at 341. Moreover, the court 
held that even if "the officer's suspicion and curiosity were aroused by the defendant's 
reclining position in a car in a dark, vacant commercial parking lo t . . . [tjhis is not 
sufficient to support a Terry stop." Id. 
The facts relating to Defendants Kassuhn and Manzanares are very similar to 
those in Kennedy. First, Officer Burton was called to the area on a suspicious persons 
report. K.R. 48:1. When Officer Burton arrived at the scene in this case, there was no 
report of loud noises, criminal activity, or even suspicion of criminal activity. There was 
merely a report that people were present in the neighborhood whom the informant did 
not recognize. K.R. 48:2. Thus, neither the defendant in Kennedy nor Defendants 
Kassuhn and Manzanares were initially suspected of criminal behavior. Second, the 
defendant in Kennedy, like Kassuhn and Manzanares, was lying down in his car and the 
officer initially thought he might be hiding. Id. at 337; K.R. 48:3. And lastly, 
incriminating evidence against the defendant in Kennedy and against Defendants here 
was found only after the initial illegal detention. Neither the scenario in Kennedy nor in 
this case supports a finding of reasonable suspicion based on articulable objective facts. 
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In sum, Officer Burton illegally seized Defendants because even considering the 
totality of the circumstances, there were no objective, articulable facts which would lead 
a reasonable person to conclude that a crime had been or was being committed. The 
totality of the circumstances in this case, lying down in a car, late at night in a place 
where one does not live, does not indicate an ambiguity, nor does it allow for a finding of 
reasonable suspicion because there was no indication that Defendants had ever 
committed a crime or that they intended to commit a crime. The State's claim that 
reasonable suspicion can be garnered from suspicion or hunches from the albeit trained 
officer is thus unfounded. Therefore, the evidence from the illegal search and seizure 
should be suppressed. 
2. Even if the initial detention is found to be lawful Officer Burton 
exceeded the scope of the stop when he asked the driver if he could search 
the car. 
The State argues that the detention of Defendants and the subsequent search of 
their persons and their vehicle satisfies this second prong because Officer Burton was 
"justifiably investigating the circumstances before him to determine whether or not the 
[Defendants were engaged in criminal activity." Br. Aple. at 18. In support of its 
argument, the State first relies on Provo City Corporation v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1993). That reliance is misplaced, however, because the decision in Spotts does 
not even address the second prong of the analysis. IdL. at 439 (stating that "Defendant 
only challenges the first prong" of the analysis which requires that the "officer's action 
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was justified at its inception"). Therefore, it has no application in the context cited by the 
State in its brief. 
The State next relies on State v. Beach to argue that Officer Burton did not have 
to accept Defendants' explanation about why they were in the neighborhood because "he 
saw them hiding on the floor of the vehicle and because they disobeyed an order not to 
move." 2002 UT App 160, 47 P.3d 932; Br. Aple. at 19. The facts in this case, however, 
are distinguishable from the case at hand. In Beach, several officers assigned to a 
narcotics unit were driving in a neighborhood for "the express purpose of detecting drug 
activity and that they had singled out that area because of its proximity to a known drug 
house." 2002 UT App 160, <|fl[2, 9. The officers spotted a car which was facing the 
opposite direction, had no license plates, and was partially parked in the traffic lane. IdL 
at %1. The officers also noticed a man on the curb hand something to one of the 
occupants of the car, which is an action that is often used in drug transactions. IdL When 
the man on the curb, the defendant in the case, noticed the officers, he began to walk in 
the opposite direction. I(L One of the officers went after the defendant, asked him for 
identification and asked him general questions about his purpose in the area. LcL at Tf1f2-3. 
After repeated requests by the officer to search the defendant, the defendant responded 
by handing the officer a bag of methamphetamine. Id^ at 5. The officer then placed the 
defendant under arrest and searched him pursuant to the arrest. IdL This Court 
concluded that "'the length and scope of the detention [was] "strictly tied and justified 
11 
by" the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible."' Id. at f 12 (quoting 
State v. Hansen. 2000 UT App 353, ^|12, 17 P.3d 1135 (citations omitted) (first alteration 
in original)). Specifically, this court held that Mthe scope of [the officer's] questioning 
was also reasonably related to the original purpose of the stop - suspected drug 
activity . . . Thus, [the officer's] continued questioning to dispel his original suspicion 
was not unreasonable." Id. at [^12. 
This case can be distinguished from Beach, in which the officers were specifically 
in the neighborhood where the defendant was located to investigate drug activity, and 
they saw the defendant engaged in behavior consistent with drug transactions. First, 
Officer Burton was not in the area to investigate drug activity or even a traffic violation. 
As far as Officer Burton was concerned, he only knew, upon arrival at the scene, that 
three persons were present who possibly did not live in the neighborhood. K.R. 48:2. 
Officer Burton was not in an area that was known for its drug trafficking or that even had 
reports of mail theft. Second, Officer Burton did not observe Defendants Kassuhn or 
Manzanares engaged in any activity which would be consistent with drug trafficking, 
mail theft, or any other crime for that matter. In fact, Officer Burton testified that the 
only articulable suspicion of criminal activity was "[d]ue to the fact of the time of the 
hour; the vehicle didn't belong in the immediate area and that the parties that were inside 
the vehicle were trying to hide themselves from view from anyone outside the vehicle." 
K.R. 48:4. However, Utah case law has rejected a finding of articulable suspicion for 
12 
cases based on the lateness of the hour and the fact that the vehicle did not belong to the 
neighborhood. See Br. Aplt. at 12-17. Third, the fact that a defendant is lying down in a 
car is not sufficient articulable reasonable suspicion to warrant the initial detention, much 
less to permit the expansion of the scope of the stop. (See_ supra subpoint 1, above; see 
also Br. Aplt. at 17-20.) Finally, Officer Burton seized the Defendants when, at 
gunpoint, he ordered them not to move. K.R. 48:3-4. An officer may only form 
reasonable suspicion from the facts known to him immediately before the stop. Ray, 
2000 UT App 55, ^ [18 (citations omitted). Thus, neither Officer Burton nor the State may 
rely upon the fact that the car door swung open after the officer had ordered Defendants 
not to move, because it is a fact that occurred after the initial stop. Therefore, the 
purpose of Officer Burton's initial stop was not reasonably related to the eventual scope 
of the stop. 
A Utah case with similar facts found that the officer did not have reasonable 
suspicion to expand the scope of the search of a defendant beyond the initial stop. State 
v. Cushing, 2004 UT App 73, 88 P.3d 368. In Cushing, the police observed a car nearly 
collide with another car and then pull into an apartment complex which was known as 
one of the worst complexes in the city for criminal activity. Id. at 1J2-3. The passenger 
got out of the car and began jogging toward the building, but when the police called out, 
he launched into a "full sprint." Id^ at ffi[3-4. The officers were eventually able to 
handcuff the defendant, search his person, and place him in the patrol car while they 
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conducted a search of the apartment where the defendant was found. IdL_ at ffif7, 23. 
Drugs and weapons were found pursuant to the search. IcL at TJ7. The Utah Court of 
Appeals, while finding that the initial stop was justified, ordered the evidence excluded 
because the officers pursued "a line of investigation 'not reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.'" IcL_ at ^22 (quoting 
State v. Lafond. 2003 UT App 101,1J12, 68 P.3d 1043). The court stated that "once the 
suspect is in police custody, the threat is dispelled, and the officers find nothing giving 
rise to an expanded scope of suspicion or probable cause, police investigative authority 
generally dissolves." IcL (citations omitted). Specifically, the court held that once the 
officers had searched the defendant and found no drugs or weapons on his person, 
police authority to detain [the defendant] and continue their investigation 
ended when their suspicions that [the defendant] had contraband or 
dangerous weapons on his person were expelled. "Once the purpose of the 
initial stop is concluded . . . the person must be allowed to depart. '"Any 
further temporary detention for [investigation] after [fulfilling] the purpose 
for the initial.. . stop'" constitutes an illegal seizure, unless an officer has 
probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of a further illegality." 
Id. at [^23 (citations omitted). 
Similarly, in this case, assuming arguendo that Officer Burton had reasonable 
suspicion to stop Defendants initially, he did not have the required reasonable suspicion 
to expand the scope of the stop to include a search of Defendants' car. LdL at Tf22 
(holding that even if reasonable suspicion exists for the initial stop, "the scope of that 
reasonable suspicion 'is still limited,'" (citing State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 
14 
1994)). Officer Burton stopped Defendants at the moment he ordered them, at gunpoint, 
not to move. K.R. 48:3-4. He then searched Defendants and handcuffed them. Officer 
Burton found no evidence of illegal activity on Defendants' persons pursuant to the 
search. He found no drugs, no weapons, or even any stolen mail on any of the 
Defendants. K.R. 48:5. The purpose of the initial stop was completed. Defendants 
should have been allowed to leave, because Officer Burton had neither probable cause 
nor reasonable suspicion to further detain Defendants, much less to search their car. 
Thus, the evidence seized from the search of the car should be suppressed as an illegal 
seizure. 
3. The search was impermissible under the plain view doctrine. 
The State's argument that Officer Burton legally seized the mail in Defendants' 
car and that this seizure was legal under the plain view doctrine is undermined by the 
record. Br. Aple. at 20; K.R. 48. Specifically, the State claims that Officer Burton was 
lawfully present when he conducted the search of the vehicle, and that the items in plain 
view, the mail, were incriminating. Br. Aple. at 20; see. also State v. Gallegos. 712 P.2d 
207, 210 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). 
First, the State argues that Officer Burton was lawfully present when the search 
and seizure occurred. Br. Aple. at 20-21. As stated above and in Appellants' initial 
brief, Officer Burton was not lawfully present when he handcuffed Defendants, 
conducted a pat-down, found no contraband or other evidence of illegal activity, and yet 
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still pursued an unlawful search by asking to search Defendants' car. (See, supra 
subpoints 1 and 2, above; see. also Br. Aplt. subpoints 2, 2a and 2b.) Once the purpose of 
Officer Burton's initial stop was complete, i.e. to inquire as to what Defendants were 
doing in the neighborhood, Defendants should have been allowed to leave. See Cushing, 
2004 UT App 73, f23. Instead, Officer Burton continued to illegally detain Defendants 
absent reasonable suspicion, leaving them in handcuffs, in order to approach the car to 
conduct a search. This constituted an unlawful seizure of Defendants which thereby 
negates any claim that Officer Burton was lawfully present at the side of the car when he 
allegedly saw the mail in "plain view." 
Second, the State does not correctly identify what mail was in plain view, 
claiming that "[fjrom where Officer Burton stood outside the vehicle, he could see mail 
that had names and addresses on it that did not belong to any of the occupants of the 
vehicle." Br. Aple. at 21. This statement is not accurate, however. Instead, what Officer 
Burton actually saw from his initial vantage point outside the car was a bundle of mail. 
K.R. 48:6-7. Specifically, Officer Burton had to bend down to look and saw "a piece of 
mail, if I remember correctly, on top that had an address that belonged to the 
neighborhood where they had been just reported coming from." K.R. 48:7. It was only 
"[u]pon pulling the mail from underneath [the seat], there was mail from a couple of 
different residences from the neighborhood." K.R. 48:7. Thus, the State's claim that 
Officer Burton could see mail with names and addresses (plural) from where he was 
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standing outside the car is not supported by Officer Burton's own testimony. Br. Aple. at 
21;K.R.48:7. 
Finally, the State claims that the mail in plain view was "clearly incriminating" 
because while standing outside the car, Officer Burton could see "mail that had names 
and addresses on it that did not belong to any of the occupants of the vehicle" and 
because "he could see that the large amount of mail appeared to have been shoved under 
the seat by someone in a hurry to dispose of it." Br. Aple. at 21. Actually, as discussed 
above, Officer Burton only saw one piece of mail with a name and address on it that did 
not belong to Defendants. K.R. 48:7. Moreover, Officer Burton did not testify that the 
mail looked as if "someone had been in a hurry to dispose of it," as claimed by the State. 
Br. Aple. at 21. Instead, he testified only that the bundle of mail was "shoved under the 
seat as if someone was just trying to quickly shove something out of their seat. It wasn't 
organized." K.R. 48:6. Under Officer Burton's own theory, then, the person might have 
just shoved the mail under the seat in order to be able to sit down to drive. Therefore, 
Officer Burton saw a bundle of mail in plain view, but only one letter in particular with 
someone else's name and address. K.R. 48:6-7. 
In order for Officer Burton to claim that the mail in plain view was clearly 
incriminating, he must have had "probable cause to associate the property with criminal 
activity." State v. Shephard. 955 P.2d 352, 357 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Probable cause 
was not present, however, where Officer Burton saw a bundle of mail, and only one letter 
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with an address and name of someone other than Defendants. That one letter, and the 
subsequent letters underneath, could have belonged to a friend of Defendants' who was 
on vacation and needed his mail to be collected. Placing the mail under the seat is also 
not "clearly incriminating," as Officer Burton himself testified that it seemed to have 
been placed under the seat in order to clear out the seat itself. K.R. 48:6. 
To legally seize evidence under the plain view doctrine, the officer must be legally 
present when the evidence is viewed, the item itself must be in plain view, and the item 
must be clearly incriminating. None of these requirements is present in this instance. 
Officer Burton illegally seized and detained Defendants, and then expanded the scope of 
the initial stop to include an illegal search of the car. Thus, he was not lawfully present. 
Second, the mail with several different names and addresses was not in plain view, as 
claimed by the State. Only one letter was clearly in view. Finally, the one letter that was 
in plain view was not "clearly incriminating." Therefore, the evidence is inadmissible 
under the plain view doctrine. 
4. The evidence was not obtained as a result of voluntary consent to search. 
The State claims Defendant Hadden, who is not a party to this appeal, gave 
Officer Burton consent to search the vehicle, and thus the evidence obtained as a result of 
the search is admissible. This argument fails, however, because Defendant Hadden's 
consent was involuntary and the evidence seized from the search was tainted by the prior 
police illegality, i.e. the illegal initial detention. 
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a. Defendant Hadden's consent to search her vehicle was not voluntary 
under the totality of the circumstances test. 
In order to determine if consent is voluntary, a court must first ascertain whether 
there was consent. State v. Hansen. 2002 UT 125, |48, 63 P.3d 650. Defendants in this 
case do not dispute that Defendant Hadden told Officer Burton he could search the car. 
They argue only that Defendant Hadden did not voluntarily consent to such a search. In 
Utah, "[wjhile consent is a factual finding, voluntariness is a legal conclusion, which is 
reviewed for correctness. When the state attempts to prove that there was voluntary 
consent after an illegal detention, it "'has a much heavier burden to satisfy than when'" 
consent is given after a permissible detention." Id^ at ^ [51 (internal citations omitted). 
The applicable standard for determining voluntariness is the "totality of the 
circumstances test, and the burden of proof is by preponderance of the evidence." IdL at 
f 56 (citing U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 242, 94 S. Ct. 988 
(1974)). Moreover, while the prosecution is not required to make a showing that the 
defendant knew of his right to refuse consent in order to establish voluntariness, such 
knowledge of one's rights is nonetheless "a factor to be taken into account," as is the use 
offeree by an officer, when considering the totality of the circumstances. IdL at Tf54; 
State v. Bobo. 803 P.2d 1268, 1273-74 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
The State relies on State v. Bobo in support of its claim that just because a 
defendant is in handcuffs does not prevent a finding of voluntary consent. Br. Aple. at 
22-23; 803 P.2d at 1273-74. The facts of State v. Bobo are as follows. Officers were 
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called to a loud party where juveniles were allegedly present and being served alcohol. 
Id. at 1270. When the defendant allowed the officers into his home to prove that no 
juveniles were present, they spotted a marijuana pipe in plain view on the counter. IcL 
The defendant was then placed under arrest, and a subsequent search revealed drugs on 
his person. Id. The officers repeatedly requested permission to search the house, and the 
defendant finally relented. Id at 1270-71. The defendant was handcuffed throughout 
the entire process. IcL at 1271. As a result of the search, other drugs were found. IcL 
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence claiming that his consent was not 
voluntary. Id The court held that M[c]onsent given while in custody does not, per se, 
render the consent involuntary. The fact that defendant was immediately handcuffed 
upon arrest and remained handcuffed similarly does not defeat a conclusion of 
voluntariness. It is but a single element for the trial court to consider." IcL at 1273-74 
(internal citations omitted) (citations omitted). In arriving at this conclusion, however, 
the court took specific notice of the fact that "even though defendant was under arrest 
and in custody, he was in the relative security and comfort of his own home." IcL at 
1274. 
This is an important distinction between the facts in Bobo and the facts in the 
present case. In Bobo, the defendant was in his home, where there was a sense of 
"relative security." Id at 1274. Although the officer exhibited a show of force, it was 
somewhat neutralized by the defendant's presence in a place in which he was 
20 
comfortable and generally secure. In the instant case, however, Defendants were 
handcuffed in the open street, in a neighborhood in which they did not reside, after 
midnight. K.R. 48:4-5. An officer's influence over a person is likely to be more 
significant if the person is handcuffed, in an alien place, in the open outdoors, in the 
middle of the night. Thus, an officer's show of force within the comforts and confines of 
one's own home cannot be compared to a relative show of force in alien surroundings. 
The facts in this case dispute a finding that Defendant Hadden voluntarily 
consented to the search of her car, under the totality of the circumstances. First, 
Defendant Hadden was first detained when Officer Burton, at gunpoint, shouted to her 
and Defendants Kassuhn and Manzanares not to move. K.R. 48:3. Second, Defendants 
Hadden, Kassuhn and Manzanares were then frisked and handcuffed. K.R. 48:5. Thus, 
Officer Burton displayed an obvious show of force immediately prior to and while 
obtaining the consent to search. Third, there is no evidence to support a claim that 
Officer Burton advised Defendants of their right to refuse consent. Moreover, the trial 
court judge who reviewed the motion to suppress, the Honorable Denise P. Lindberg, 
made no findings on the record as to whether Defendant Hadden's consent was 
voluntary. K.R. 48:16-17. What the record does contain, however, is evidence that 
Defendant Hadden gave her consent under considerable coercion, absent any warnings 
that she had the right to refuse such consent. K.R. 48:3-5. Although separately none of 
these things per se render a consent involuntary, taken under the totality of the 
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circumstances, the claim of voluntary consent becomes suspect. The burden of proof lies 
on the State, and they have not met their burden. 
b. The evidence seized by Officer Burton was tainted by the prior illegality 
of the unlawful detention. 
Assuming arguendo that this Court determines that Defendant Hadden gave 
voluntary consent, the fact that a defendant consents voluntarily to a search or seizure 
"does not necessarily remove the taint [of a prior illegality]." State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 
684, 691 (Utah 1990) (quoting State v. Cates. 202 Conn. 615, 621, 522 A.2d 788, 791 
(1987)). That is, if evidence is obtained through "police exploitation of a prior 
illegality," that evidence is tainted and therefore excludable due to the violation of the 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f62. A court, in 
conducting an exploitation analysis, should consider three factors set forth by the Utah 
Supreme Court: "(1) the 'purpose and flagrancy' of the illegal conduct, (2) 'the presence 
of intervening circumstances/ and (3) the 'temporal proximity' between the illegal 
detention and consent." IcL at ^64 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 45 
L.Ed.2d 416, 95 S. Ct. 2254 (1975)) (citations omitted). 
In Hansen, the Utah Supreme Court found that although the defendant had 
consented voluntarily to the search, that consent was tainted when the officer exceeded 
the scope of the initial traffic stop and illegally seized the defendant. Id. at 1fl[66, 71. In 
making a routine traffic stop, the officer took the defendant's license and registration and 
determined that he had no outstanding warrants. Id. at ^6 -7 , 13. Upon returning the 
22 
defendant's license and registration, the officer asked him if he had any drugs or alcohol. 
IcL at <||13. The officer then asked for consent to search the car, which was given. IcL at f^ 
14. In holding that the officer exploited the prior illegality of the defendant's seizure in 
order to obtain consent to search the car, the court stated that "[s]eeking consent under 
such circumstances shows the purpose of the illegal detention 'was to exploit the 
opportunity to ask for consent.'" Id. at ^ [66 (quoting State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 
289, 294 (Utah 1995)). Furthermore, there were no intervening circumstances, such as 
informing a defendant that "he or she has the right to refuse consent or to consult with an 
attorney" and thus the "illegality of [the officer's] conduct was not mitigated." IcL. at ^|68. 
Finally, the court held that there was "no appreciable time . . . between the illegal 
detention and the consent that would have allowed the taint of the misconduct to 
dissipate." IdatH69. 
Similarly, the taint of the illegal seizure of Defendants Kassuhn and Manzanares 
requires this Court to exclude the evidence found by the search of their car, after 
Defendant Hadden gave consent. First, after Officer Burton conducted a pat-down frisk 
of Defendants and found no contraband, Defendants should have been free to leave. K.R. 
48:5. Instead, Officer Burton sought consent, while the defendants were in handcuffs 
and not free to leave, to search their car. K.R. 48:6. Thus, there was a direct connection 
between Officer Burton's misconduct and Defendant Hadden's consent. Second, there 
were no intervening factors between Officer Burton's misconduct and the consent to 
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search the vehicle by Defendant Hadden. After Defendants were frisked and handcuffed, 
Officer Burton asked them why they were in the area. K.R. 48:5. When Officer Burton 
did not like Defendants' answers, he asked to search the vehicle. K.R. 48:6. Thus, there 
were no intervening factors to mitigate Officer Burton's misconduct. Finally, there was 
no appreciable time between the illegal detention and Defendant Hadden's consent to 
search the vehicle. Officer Burton held Defendants at gunpoint, frisked them, asked 
them each a single question about their presence in the area, and then asked for consent 
to search the car. K.R. 48:3-6. There was no appreciable time between the illegal 
detention and the subsequent consent given that would have allowed the taint of Officer 
Burton's conduct to dissipate. Thus, the evidence must be excluded. 
CONCLUSION 
The officer in this case violated Defendants' Fourth Amendment rights when, 
under the totality of the circumstances test, he seized them without articulable reasonable 
suspicion and proceeded to exceed the scope of the stop when he asked for permission to 
search their car. Neither the plain view doctrine nor the suspect consent given by 
Defendant Hadden is able to overcome the taint of the illegality of the initial seizure. 
The unlawful search and seizure violated the constitutional rights of Defendants, and any 
evidence discovered as a result thereof should be suppressed. Based on the foregoing, 
Defendants respectfully request this Court to reverse the trial court order on the motion to 
suppress. 
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